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MAKING NONINTERPRETIVISM 
RESPECTABLE: MICHAEL J. PERRY'S 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
Richard B. Saphire* 
THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN IN-
QUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING 
BY THE JUDICIARY. By Michael J. Perry. New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press. 1982. Pp. xi, 241. $24. 
On Monday, while we are arguing for a result in court that would be 
hard to justify in terms of the written Constitution, we say things like: "Oh 
well, any sophisticated lawyer understands that the text of the Constitution 
is really not very clear, its history is often extremely ambiguous, and in 
many areas simply unknown. That being so, why shouldn't the court just 
do good as we define the good?" 
But. on Tuesday, after the decision has been made, we find ourselves 
talking to a different and much larger group, people who are not constitu-
tional theorists and who may be enraged at what the court has done. These 
tend to be regarded by the constitutional cognoscenti as the great un-
washed. To them, we do not mention the ambiguities, the uncertainties 
that underlie the decision. We certainly don't mention the political basis 
for the decision. Instead, we say to them, "Why, you are attacking the 
Constitution." That, of course, is not what the critics are doing. 
If noninterpretivism is to be respectable, its scholars must stop talking 
this way. When they address the public, they should say, frankly, "No, 
that decision does not come out of the written or historical Constitution. It 
is based upon a moral choice the judges made, and here is why judges are 
entitled to make it for you."1 
I 
Professor Perry sets out to articulate and justify a theory for "fierce" 
judicial activism (p. 139). At least since the publication of an article in 1975 
by Thomas Grey,2 activist theories (whether "fierce" or not) generally have 
been labeled "noninterpretivist," while theories urging judicial restraint 
have been labeled "interpretivist." While the precise definitions assigned to 
• Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law. B.A. 1967, Ohio State Univer-
sity; J.D. 1971, Northern Kentucky University, Salmon P. Chase College of Law; LL.M. 1975, 
Harvard University. - Ed. 
I. Bork, The Struggle Over the Role of the Court, NATL. REV., Sept. 17, 1982, at 1137, 1139 
[hereinafter cited as Bork, Role of the Court]. 
2. Grey, Do We Have a Wrillen Constitution?, 21 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975). 
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these theories have varied somewhat,3 the important distinctions between 
the two are fairly clear. Professor Grey's account of their distinctive aspects 
should suffice: 
The pure interpretive model should not be confused with literalism in 
constitutional interpretation, particularly with "narrow" or "crabbed" lit-
eralism. The interpretive model, at least in the hands of its sophisticated 
exponents, certainly contemplates that the courts may look through the 
sometimes opaque text to the purposes behind it in determining constitu-
tional norms. Normative inferences may be drawn from silences and omis-
sions, from structures and relationships, as well as from explicit 
commands .... 
What distinguishes the exponent of the pure interpretive model is his 
insistence that the only norms used in constitutional adjudication must be 
those inferable from the text - that the Constitution must not be seen as 
licensing courts to articulate and apply contemporary norms not demon-
strably expressed or implied by the framers.4 
Although the interpretivism-noninterpretivism distinction is not, either 
in its articulation or theoretical significance, without ambiguity or contro-
versy, 5 it does seem to capture the essence of a major dispute among consti-
tutional theorists. It is generally conceded that when courts invalidate 
legislative decisions on the basis of values with at least firm roots in the 
written Constitution, their decisions are presumptively legitimate.6 On the 
3. For a sampling of some of the literature employing the interpretivist/noninterpretivist 
distinction, see Alexander, Modern Equal Protection Theories: A Metatheoretical Taxonomy 
and Critique, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 3 (1981); Berger, Government by Judiciary: John Hart Ely's 
"Invitation'~ 54 IND. L.J. 277 (1979); Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469 
(1981); Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure And Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399 (1978); 
Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982); Grano, Judicial Review and a 
Written Constitution in a /}emocratic Society, 28 WAYNE L. REV. l (1981); Monaghan, Our 
Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981). See also White, Reflections on the role of 
the Supreme Court: the contemporary debate and the "lessons" of history, 63 JUDICATURE 162 
(1979); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. l (1971) 
[hereinafter cited as Bork, Neutral Principles] .. 
4. Grey, supra note 2, at 706 n.9 (emphasis in original). 
Professor Perry elaborates the distinction between interpretive and noninterpretive review 
at pp. 10-11. On the distinction between interpretivism and "literalism," see pp. 32-33. 
5. For example, Professor Dworkin has argued: 
Any recognizable theory of judicial review is interpretive in the sense that it aims to pro-
vide an interpretation of the Constitution as an original, foundational legal document, 
and also aims to integrate the Constitution into our constitutional and legal practice as a 
whole. No one proposes judicial review as if on a clean slate. 
Dworkin, supra note 3, at 472. For further criticism of the interpretivism-noninterpretivism 
distinction, see Lupu, Constitutional Theory and the Search far the Workable Premise, 8 U. 
DAYTON L. REV._ (forthcoming 1983). This article will be published as part of a symposium 
marking the publication of Professor Perry's book. 
6. The concern for legitimacy is based upon the perceived requirements of democratic 
political theory and the related concern for judicial discretion. Most theorists accept, as a 
general proposition, that in our democracy the development and implementation of public 
policy is entrusted to institutions and individuals who are accountable to the electorate. In-
deed, Professor Perry claims that our commitment to electorally accountable policymaking is 
"axiomatic" (p. 9). But see Tushnet, The /}i/emmas of Liberal Constitutionalism, 42 OHIO ST. 
LJ. 411, 428-29 (1981); Tushnet, /}arkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John 
Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1058-60 (1980). Since federal judges are 
not electorally accountable - at least they are thought considerably less accountable than are 
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other hand, where courts are perceived as acting on the basis of norms 
whose source cannot fairly be traced to the Constitution, the legitimacy of 
their power is often regarded as suspect. What divides most theorists and 
judges is the determination of how clear and direct the constitutional pedi-
gree must be.7 
Neither interpretivism nor noninterpretivism has been a monolithic phi-
losophy. There are, for example, advocates of narrow and broad interpreti-
vism. Justice Black was considered a narrow interpretivist: in some cases 
he took the view that the Constitution prohibits only those specific practices 
which the framers intended to ban. 8 Others, dissatisfied with the implica-
tions of such an approach,9 have argued for a "broad interpretivism" pursu-
elected legislators and executives, see generally J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NA-
TIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 4-59 (1980) - they cannot depend upon periodic mandates from 
the electorate to justify their authority. Instead, their authority must derive from the Constitu-
tion itself which, at least insofar as it provides for individual rights, limits the permissible scope 
and content of majoritarian policymaking. Where courts cannot plausibly trace the exercise of 
their power to the Constitution, that power may be considered suspect. 
Given these perceptions, the legitimacy of judicial decisions will depend upon the extent to 
which they can be defended as objective interpretations of the applicable constitutional provi-
sions. Assuming that at least some constitutional restrictions on majoritarian power are am-
biguous, the question of whom to trust with ultimate interpretive authority arises. Although it 
may be argued that ambiguities should always be resolved against the exercise of judicial 
power, Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American i)octrine of Constitutional Law, 1 HARV. 
L. REv. 129, 143-52 (1893), that position is problematic. As Professor Perry notes: "[T]he 
legislature and executive branches of government cannot always be trusted to resolve in an 
impartial way, or, indeed, even to deliberate about, questions concerning the consistency of 
their actions with the framers' value judgments ... " (p. 19); see also R. DWORKIN, TAKING 
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 140-49 (1977). But where there is serious doubt with respect to the pedi-
gree of a right claimed to have constitutional status, whose judgment should prevail? The 
answer to this question may depend upon the persuasiveness of the argument that a court's 
determination is the product of a suitably objective and restrained process of reasoning instead 
of the product of unbridled interpretive discretion. The legitimacy of a decision will vary 
inversely with the judicial discretion which led to its determination. See, e.g., Grano, supra 
note 3, at 19. On the issue of judicial discretion, see generally Greenawalt, i)iscretion and 
Judicial J)ecision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters that Bind Judges, 15 CoLUM. L. REV. 359 
(1975). · 
7. In San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973), a major issue sepa-
rating Justice Powell, writing for the majority, and Justice Marshall, writing in dissent, was 
whether education was a right protected by the Constitution. In holding that, at least in the 
circumstances of that case, education did not achieve constitutional status, Justice Powell ar-
gued that it was not "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." 411 U.S. at 33-
34. Although Justice Marshall agreed with Powell that ''the determination of which interests 
are fundamental should be firmly rooted in the text of the Constitution," 411 U.S. at 102, he 
criticized ''the majority's labored efforts to demonstrate that fundamental interests, which call 
for strict scrutiny . . . , encompass only established rights which we are somehow bound to 
recognize from the text of the Constitution itself." 411 U.S. at 99. Certain rights not specified 
in the text are entitled to protection, argued Marshall, depending upon how close their nexus 
to those which are textually explicit. What a court must determine is "the extent to which 
constitutionally guaranteed rights are dependent on interests not mentioned in the Constitu-
tion." 411 U.S. at 102. One way to analyze the Powell-Marshall dispute is in terms of their 
differing perceptions of the extent to which education was directly related to constitutionally 
explicit rights (e.g., freedom of speech) and thus fairly inferrable therefrom. 
8. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 364-67 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting). On 
Justice Black's interpretivism, see J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 2 (1980). 
9. Professor Grano has argued that "[i]nterpretivism cannot be narrow in scope because 
this would defeat the framers' purpose of trying to govern the future through broad, general 
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ant to which courts could move beyond the specific concerns and practices 
of the framers and evaluate contemporary practices in terms of their rela-
tionship to the general evils with which the framers were concerned. 10 Sim-
ilarly, noninterpretivists may vary in their analysis of the appropriate 
sources and methods for deriving constitutional values and in their assess-
ment of the legitimacy of particular decisions. For example, Dean Welling-
ton argues that courts can ascertain and enforce conventional morality but 
concludes thatRoe v. Wade 11 was wrongly decided,12 while Professor Perry 
once defended Roe on the basis of its congruence with conventional moral-
ity.13 And, while many avid noninterpretivists have been reluctant to en-
dorse reasoning from principles derived from natural law, Professor Grey 
has defended such a methodology.14 
Despite their numerous differences, noninterpretivist scholars generally 
have been united in one important respect: they have rejected the interpre-
tivists' claim that noninterpretivism would either require or permit courts to 
ignore the written Constitution and its authoritative effect.15 Instead, 
noninterpretive methodologies are defended as either mandated or author-
ized, either explicitly or implicitly, by the Constitution's text and structure, 
and the framers' intent.16 To be sure; many noninterpretivists might con-
proscriptions; interpretivism cannot be narrow precisely because constitutional provisions are 
rarely narrow or specific in definition." Grano, supra note 3, at 64. 
IO. Id. at 64-68. See also J. ELY, supra note 8, at 13-14; Monaghan, supra note 3, at 363. 
11. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (invalidating a Texas statute prohibiting most abortions). 
12. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional JJouble Standards: Some Notes on 
Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 243-49 (1973). 
13. Perry,Abortion, The Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of Sub-
stantive JJue Process, 23 UCLA L. RE.v. 689, 723-34 (1976). While Perry still defends Roe, he 
has now rejected conventional morality as a legitimate source for constitutional values (p. 94). 
14. Grey, supra note 2, at 714-16. See also Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: 
Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. RE.v. 843 (1978) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Grey, Origins]. For a useful analysis and comparison of the work of prominent 
noninterpretivists, see Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions 
of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981). 
15. For such an interpretivist argument, see Grano, supra note 3, at 18-30;• 
16. See, e.g., Grey, Origins, supra note 14, at 892-93 (claiming that the framers endorsed a 
natural rights philosophy which became part of the written Constitution and which justifies 
judicial elaboration of unwritten constitutional norms); D.A.J. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITI-
CISM OF LAW 50-52 (1972); Richards, Human Rights as the Unwritten Constitution: The Prob-
lem of Change and Stability in Constitutional Interpretation, 4 U. DAYTON L. RE.v. 295, 298-303 
(1979) (arguing that the framers subscribed to a contractarian theory whose meaning and sig-
nificance cannot be limited to a narrow conception of individual rights). q. J. ELY,supra note 
8, at 11-41 (arguing that a narrow "clause-bound" interpretivism must be rejected in favor of 
an approach which permits judges to derive the content of particular constitutional provisions 
from the general themes of the whole Constitution, such as an approach justified on the basis 
of the framers' "invitation"). 
It should be noted that noninterpretivists do not ordinarily claim that either their method-
ologies or the decisions which they produce flow inexorably from specific and concrete value 
judgments made by the framers. Indeed, they argue that given the ambiguity of language 
contained in many important constitutional provisions and the dynamic nature of constitution-
alism, such an approach is both impossible and undesirable. What they do claim, however, is 
that noninterpretivism is not simply a process whereby judges make purely political policy 
decisions. Instead, they defend noninterpretivism as a legitimate mode of constitutional 
interpretation. 
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cede Judge Bork's claim that many of the modern Court's most controver-
sial decisions do "not come out of the written or historical Constitution,"17 
at least if this is taken to mean that those decisions were not mechanically 
"lifted" from the constitutional text. But they would regard this concession 
as unremarkable, since, in their view, any coherent constitutional method-
ology - noninterpretive or otherwise - requires the exercise of some judg-
ment and interpretive discretion on the part of a court. Certainly, most 
noninterpretivists would reject Bork's suggestion that noninterpretive deci-
sions are based purely and simply upon "a moral choice the judges 
made," 18 at least if this is taken to mean - as Judge Bork clearly intended 
- that those decisions are products of the judges' purely personal and idio-
syncratic moral preferences. 19 In fact, as noted above, most noninterpre-
ti vists would want to claim that their proposed resolutions for 
contemporary constitutional problems are informed by, and ultimately jus-
tified in terms of, the Constitution itself. 
II 
Professor Perry, however, is not your ordinary noninterpretivist. He 
claims that "most constitutional decisions and doctrines of the modern pe-
riod (concerning human rights issues) ... cannot fairly be understood as 
the products of anything but noninterpretive review . . . ."20 This claim, 
by itself, is not remarkable.21 However, what I believe separates Perry from 
his noninterpretive colleagues is his further observation that both the prac-
tice and the results of noninterpretive review have "no plausible textual or 
historical justification" - that there is "no way to avoid the conclusion that 
noninterpretive review, whether of state or federal action, cannot be justi-
fied by reference either to the text or to the intentions of the framers of the 
Constitution" (p. 24). To support this observation, Perry devotes chapter 3 
to an examination of "Interpretivism, Freedom of Expression, and Equal 
Protection.22 Here, he reiterates his earlier view that Raoul Berger's histori-
17. Bork, Role of the Court, supra note I, at 1139. 
18. Jd. 
19. For an example of a contemporary noninterpretivist decision in which the Court ar-
gued strenuously against the notion that the decision represented only the personal, idiosyn-
cratic moral preference of the justices, see Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504-
06 (1977) (plurality opinion) (holding that the right to privacy protected the extended-family 
relationship). Moore is extensively criticized in Grano,supra note 3, at 8-11. For an argument 
that such judicial discretion rarely characterizes - and indeed need not characterize - the 
judicial process in hard cases, see R. DWORKIN, supra note 6. 
20. P. 11 (footnote omitted). Elsewhere, Perry writes that "in very few consequential 
human rights cases of the modem period can the Court's decisions even plausibly be explained 
as products of interpretive review." P. 130. Although I believe he never comes out and says it, 
it seems clear that Perry believes there is no such case. 
21. Many theorists have either argued or conceded this point. See, e.g., Grey, supra note 2, 
at 10-14. 
22. Chapter l is devoted to a general examination of the "problem oflegitimacy" in consti-
tutional theory. Chapter 2, entitled "Noninterpretive Review, Federalism, and the Separation 
of Powers," deals with the question of whether noninterpretive review can be justified with 
respect to federalism and separation-of-powers issues. Perry concludes that noninterpretive 
review in such cases cannot be justified in terms of the constitutional text or history. He does 
admit that there is a functional justification for judicial review in dormant commerce clause 
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cal analysis of the framers' intent with respect to the fourteenth amendment 
is essentially correct.23 The framers did not intend "to make applicable to 
the states the first amendment or any other provision of the Bill of Rights" 
(p. 61), nor did they intend "for the amendment to have any effect on segre-
gated public schooling or on segregation generally."24 Thus, in the cases 
that noninterpretivists are most concerned with defending - for example, 
Brown v. Board of Education,25 Roe v. Wade,26 and the numerous 
cases applying the first amendment to the states - the Court was not en-
forcing the framers' value judgments. Indeed, it was not enforcing "the 
Constitution" at all.27 Instead, the Court, as its interpretive critics have 
warned us all along, has been engaged in policymaking, not constitutional 
"interpretation." And what might seem even worse, it has been formulating 
and enforcing value judgments of its own. This, Perry admits, is presump-
cases - even though that review cannot be justified by the constitutional text and framers' 
intent - but concludes that these cases do not involve noninterpretive review at all since the 
Court is acting in an essentially legislative capacity. Pp. 38-40. With respect to separation-of-
powers cases, functional considerations also justify noninterpretive review, but unlike review 
in human rights cases, the Court merely implements the "policy choice of one electorally ac-
countable branch." P. 59. Thus, in such cases, judicial review is not countermajoritarian and 
does not raise legitimacy-related concerns. Examination of these areas leads Perry to conclude 
that "no consideration presented by either federalism or separation-of-powers issues under-
mines the interpretivist claim that all noninterpretive review ... is illegitimate." P. 60. 
23. Perry, Book Review, 78 CoLUM. L. REV. 685 (1978) (reviewing R. BERGER, GOVERN-
MENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977)). 
Perry continues to be one of the few prominent constitutional scholars who endorses Berger's 
historical (although not theoretical) conclusions concerning the meaning of the fourteenth 
amendment. For the latest installment in the battle against Berger, see Dimond, Strict Con-
structlon and Judldal Revlew of Rada! Dlscrlmlnatlon Under the Equal Protectlon Clause: 
Meetlng Raoul Berger on Interpretlvlst Grounds, 80 MICH. L. REV. 462 (1982). In a forthcom-
ing article, I have evaluated and criticized the phenomenon of "out-Bergering Berger." See 
Saphire, Judidal Review ln the Name of the Constltutlon, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV._ (forthcom-
ing 1983). 
24. Pp. 66-67 (footnote omitted). Although Perry has argued that the equal protection 
clause does yield a principle of racial equality which is incompatible with most forms of racial 
(including school) segregation, he rejects the claim that such a principle was constitutionalized 
by the framers. Id. See generally Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and 
Appralsal, 19 CoLUM. L. REV. 1023 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Modern Equal Protectlon]. 
In addition to his conclusion regarding the original understanding of the equal protection 
clause, Perry argues that, with respect to the privileges-or-immunities clause, the framers 
"meant only to protect, against state action discriminating on the basis of race, a narrow cate-
gory of 'fundamental' rights .... " P. 23. He thus rejects John Ely's conclusion that that 
clause "was a delegation to future constitutional decision-makers [that is, the judiciary] to 
protect certain rights that the [Constitution] neither lists, at least not exhaustively, nor even in 
any specific way gives directions for finding." Id., quoting J. ELY, supra note 8, at 28. 
25. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
26. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
27. Perry spends considerable time pointing out and criticizing important inconsistencies 
in the positions of prominent interpretivists such as Judge Bork and Justice Rehnquist. Al-
though he contends that "interpretivism is not an impossible position to maintain," p. 23 (foot-
note omitted), he claims that these theorists have not been able or prepared to apply it in a 
principled fashion. He claims that neither Bork's endorsement of Brown v. Board of Educatlon 
nor Rehnquist's willingness to apply the first amendment to the states can be justified in terms 
of value judgments constitutionalized by the framers. Pp. 64-69. For elaboration of Bork's 
and Rehnquist's constitutional philosophies, see Bork, Neutral Prlnclples, supra note 3; Rehn-
quist, The Notlon of a Llvlng Constltutlon, 54 TEXAS L. REV. 693 (1976). 
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tively antidemocratic and therefore illegitimate. It can be defended, if at 
all,28 only upon the establishment of a special justification. 
In chapter 4, entitled ''Noninterpretive Review in Human Rights Cases: 
A Functional Justification,"29 Perry elaborates the special justification for 
- noninterpretive review. That justification is functional: it is based on the 
notion that noninterpretive review serves "a crucial governmental function, 
perhaps even an indispensable one, that no other practice can realistically 
be expected to serve . . ." (p. 92). The importance of that function, and the 
Court's competence to perform it, is based upon Perry's understanding of 
our political-moral order. That understanding, in tum, is based upon the 
following propositions: (1) that we, as a polity, have been and remain com-
mitted to the notion of moral evolution (p. 99); (2) that ''we seem to be open 
to the possibility that there are right answers to political-moral problems," 
and that even ifwe are not, we should be open to that possibility30 (p. 102); 
and (3) that, at least comparatively, the Court is suited to help us keep faith 
with our commitment to moral evolution and our search for right answers 
to political-moral problems in a way which our electorally accountable in-
stitutions are not (pp. 100-02). Thus, while "[t]he Constitution established 
by the framers does not ordain a perfectly just political order" (p. 88), as a 
polity we are committed to an ongoing moral reevaluation and growth 
which (we hope) will allow us to achieve such perfection. Perry believes 
that without an activist Court, we would be unable to fulfill this 
commitment. 
But if courts are to play an important, indeed a necessary, role in help-
ing us keep faith with these commitments, how shall they do so? Other 
noninterpretivists have claimed that if the Court is to act legitimately, it 
must be guided by sources which exist outside the judge herself. Indeed, if 
1 anything has an axiomatic status in constitutional law, it is the notion that judges cannot decide cases - or at least admit they are deciding cases - by 
resorting to their own values.31 Few have been bold enough to defend such 
28. Perry's entire theory is based upon the assumption that our polity is deeply committed 
to electorally accountable policymaking and that noninterpretive review presumptively vio-
lates that commitment. He notes, however, that "[i]f I were unable to defend constitutional 
policymaking by the judiciary as consistent with the principle of electorally accountable poli-
cymaking, then, given my commitment to constitutional policymaking by the judiciary, I 
would have to question the axiomatic character of the principle of electorally accountable 
policymaking." P. 10 n.*. 
29. Chapter 4 was previously published, in substantial part, as the lead article in a sympo-
sium on constitutional theory. See Perry, Noninterpretive Review in Human Rights Coses: A 
Functional Just!ftcotion, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV, 278 (1981). 
30. Perry rejects the "moral skepticism" of interpretivists such as Judge Bork, a rejection 
which he regards as a necessary but insufficient prerequisite to a defense of noninterpretive 
review and a rejection of interpretive review. He proceeds under the "assumption that there 
might be right answers" to political-moral problems, p. 107, an assumption which he does not 
defend in his book, but which he hopes to defend in his future work. P. x. 
31. For examples of the verbal gymnastics judges have employed to convince others (or 
themselves?) that they have not engaged in such a process, see Adamson v. Palko, 332 U.S. 46, 
59-68 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-87 
(1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-506 
(1977) (plurality opinion); 431 U.S. at 541-49 (White, J., dissenting). For prominent scholarly 
discussions of this point, see B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 98-141 
(1921); Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rowls' Theory of 
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judicial reasoning, and those that have have defended it only as a matter of 
last resort.32 In what is certain to be the most controversial aspect of his 
theory, Professor Perry argues - boldly and with conviction (indeed, this is 
an area where his argumentation is especially passionate) - that the Court, 
in performing its dialectical and persuasive functions of helping us seek 
right answers to our political-moral problems and forging a new moral or-
der, must subject conventional morality to critical evaluation. In this 
process, 
the justice, like the legislator, will inevitably conclude that some particular 
political-moral principles (perhaps even a particular political-moral sys-
tem) are better than others. Inevitably each justice will deal with human 
rights problems in terms of the particular political-moral criteria that are, 
in that justice's view, authoritative. I do not see how it could possibly be 
otherwise.33 
In cases where the Constitution is silent, or expresses no judgment to the 
contrary,34 the Court must evaluate the "constitutionality" (it almost seems 
. awkward to say it) of a policy generated by the electorally accountable 
political process by subjecting it to a "moral critique." That critique results 
in a judgment by a majority of the Court - a judgment based upon the 
Court's determination of the right answer to the human rights issue before 
it. In this process, "the ultimate source of decisional norms is the judge's 
own values (albeit, values ideally arrived at through, and tested in the cruci-
ble of, a very deliberate search for right answers)" (p. 123). Although Perry 
concedes that "it is a radical thing to say, and hence a thing not often said, 
that the source of judgment is the judge's own values," he "cannot see any 
way to avoid concluding that, in the exercise of noninterpretive review . . . 
the determinative norms derive - again, not in an unself-critical way -
from the judge's own moral vision" (p. 123). 
This, then, is Perry's conception of the functional justification for 
noninterpretive review. He recognizes, however, that when judges engage 
in such a function - one which he considers prophetic - they will often 
interpose what is unabashedly their own moral vision against the best that 
the political processes have had to offer. Even though our society may be 
Justice, 121 u. PA. L. REV. 962, 1004-10 (1973); R. DWORK.IN,supra note 6, at 123-30; J. ELY, 
supra note 8, at 44-48. 
32. See, e.g., Greenawalt, Policy, Rights, and Judicial Decision, 11 GA. L. R.E.v. 991, 1047-
53 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Greenawalt, Judicial Decision]; Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 
1980 AM. B. FOUNDATION REs. J. 645, 736-37. 
33. P. 111 (footnote omitted). 
34. Perry's theory is concerned with justifying noninterpretive review where the value 
judgment that the Court seeks to apply was not constitutionalized by the framers. In such 
cases, the Court would be acting extraconstitutionally. He explicitly excludes from the theory's 
concern cases in which the court acts contraconstitutionally - that is, where the decision 
would create "a result contrary to a state of affairs that is constitutionally required." P. 74. In 
the preface to the book, he refers to contraconstitutional policymaking as a basic issue which 
he will address in a later essay. P. ix. Elsewhere, Perry has written that to say that a decision 
was contraconstitutional would "certainly be to condemn it." Modem Equal Protection, supra 
note 24, at 1032-33 n.47. Dean Sandalow has suggested that, under certain conditions, a deci-
sion which went against a specific value judgment of the framers might be defended as legiti-
mate, Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1060-68 (1981), a 
position with which I agree. See Saphire, supra note 23, at _ 
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committed to moral growth and evolution, Perry is acutely aware and 
equally confident of our commitment to electorally accountable policymak-
ing. Rejecting the efficacy of other forms of political control, Perry, follow-
ing Charles Black before him, 35 resolves this tension by recognizing plenary 
power in Congress to check the federal courts' noninterpretive decision-
making by controlling their jurisdiction (pp. 128-37). Such power is "a 
proper vehicle for electorally accountable policymakers to control the value 
judgments, not of past framers, but of electorally unaccountable judges" (p. 
123 n.t). Perry makes this "concession" to Congress reluctantly - al-
though given his recognition that the people and the Court are partners in 
the process of moral evolution, the reason for his reluctance is unclear -
because he does not "see how anyone who is interested in justifying 
noninterpretive review, and who takes seriously the principles of electorally 
accountable policymaking, can avoi.i making that concession" (p. 137). 
III 
Professor Perry's theory is as intricate and complex as it is provocative. 
By conceding that judges have not decided most contemporary human 
rights cases on the basis of the written or historical Constitution, but that, 
instead, they have acted on the basis of their own moral vision, he has per-
haps answered Robert Bork's plea that noninterpretivism be made respecta-
ble.36 But while respectability may be a virtue, it remains to be seen 
whether Perry has done noninterpretivism any favors. Space does not per-
mit evaluation of all of the important aspects of Perry's theory. Conse-
quently, I will focus on two major and related matters: his argument that 
our society is committed to moral evolution and his claim that judges 
should decide human rights cases on the basis of their own values. 
Professor Perry's understanding and vision of American society seems 
to be based on his assessment of our history and his personal faith. It does 
seem to me that, as a matter of historical observation, we have as a nation 
had a conception of ourselves which at least approximates and makes plau-
sible Perry's conception of our "religious self-understanding."37 At the 
time of the framing, there were many who believed that "Americans, like 
the Israelites of old, were God's chosen people."38 And this notion of 
America's special role in the world - a role defined in large part by a sense 
of our moral decency and enlightenment, if not our moral superiority -
persists to this day.39 As Charles Miller has noted, the belief in the Ameri-
35. C. BLACK, DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW 36-43, 76-79 (1981); Black, The Presidency 
and Congress, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 841, 845-49 (1973). See also Wechsler, The Appellate 
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Reflections on the Law and the Logistics of Direct Review, 34 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1043 (1977). 
36. Bork, The Role of the Court, supra note I, at 1139. 
37. For Perry's conception of our collective, religious self-understanding, see pp. 97-98. 
38. G. Wooo, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 115 (1969). I 
cannot resist noting that Wood cites, as an example of persons publicly endorsing this concep-
tion of America, Perry, Sermon, May 11, 1775. Id. at 115 n.58. 
39. See, e.g., Co=encement Address at the University of Notre Dame, delivered by Pres-
ident Ji=y Carter, May 22, 1977, reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN 
POLICY 302 (D. Ko=ers & G. Loescher eds. 1979). 
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can mission has had both theological and secular-political foundations.40 
But like much theology and politics, this missionary zeal has had its less 
seemly side. Abroad, we have, on occasion, been known to engage in ac-
tions whose morality is (and was) suspect.41 And at home -well, we may 
have made some progress in both absolute and relative terms in our treat-
ment of minorities and the disadvantaged, but our record is certainly equiv-
ocal. Moreover, the social and economic policies currently in place suggest 
to me - and, I would imagine, to Perry - significant doubt with respect to 
either the substance or the strength of our nation's moral commitments. 
But perhaps this is Perry's point. Perhaps it is in times like these that we 
need the moral leadership of the Court. Perhaps the Court, "an institution 
that resolves moral problems not simply by looking backward to the sedi-
ment of old moralities, but ahead to emergent principles" (p. 111), can in-
deed help us forge a new moral order - or at least recapture elements of 
our past moral enlightenment. The prospect is intriguing, but somewhat 
problematic. 
Belief and even faith in an American religious self-understanding42 
does not, in itself, provide much of a structure for discerning the moral 
values which might guide human rights adjudication. While it is one thing 
to agree with Perry that our polity is committed to moral evolution - in-
deed, I believe that the Constitution embodies and expresses that commit-
ment43 - it is quite another to discern the direction of that evolution and 
the moral values it promises to yield. Like Perry, I am not a moral philoso-
pher. Many of my moral conceptions are largely intuitive. But Perry's the-
ory presents a number of issues which a judge must confront. For example, 
Perry speaks of the need "to bring our collective (political) practice into 
ever closer harmony with our evolving, deepening moral understanding" 
(p. 99). The search for right answers to fundamental political-moral 
problems must be undertaken in the context of our commitment to ongoing 
moral growth. But what does Perry mean by "moral growth" and "moral 
evolution"? Do growth and evolution suggest an inexorable process lead-
ing toward greater mutual understanding and love? Do they suggest a com-
mitment to more perfect realization of human equality or of substantive or 
procedural justice? Perry's argument that noninterpretive review is neces-
sary to lead us to "a more mature political morality" (p. 113) can be read to 
suggest the notion that we are irrevocably committed to a moral awakening 
40. C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 171-72 (1969). 
41. For an interesting account of the more questionable aspects of America's missionary 
zeal, see w. WILLIAMS, EMPIRE AS A WAY OF LIFE (1980). 
42. Perry's evocation of religious metaphors unquestionably will serve as a lightning rod to 
those for whom notions of the justices as divinely inspired prophets have long been anathema. 
This will no doubt be true notwithstanding his attempt to forestall such criticism: 
I want to emphasize, as strenuously as I can, that in the following discussion I use the 
word religious in its etymological sense, to refer to a binding vision - a vision that serves 
as a source of unalienated self-understanding, of "meaning" in the sense of existential 
orientation or rootedness. I do not use the word in any sectarian, theistic, or otherwise 
metaphysical sense. 
P. 97 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). See also pp. 99-100. 
43. See Saphire, The Search far Legitimacy in Constitutional Theory: What Price Purity?, 
42 OHIO ST. L.J. 335, 352-56 (1981). 
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in which we seek to move inexorably toward fruition of liberal ideals.44 
Thus, he refers to JJred Scott and Lochner as examples of occasions in 
which "noninterpretive review has served, and can again, as an impediment 
to moral growth" (p. 125). 
It is, of course, possible to view the notions of moral evolution and 
growth as embracing the possibility that we can and may (should?) be mov-
ing away from the ideals of the liberal left. Perry seems to concede as much 
with his reluctance "to assume that a single moral system will ever have an 
exclusive claim on the mind of man" or that there is a "single authoritative 
moral system" (p. 109).45 Moreover, he admits that courts following his 
theory may - at least in terms of process - act legitimately when they 
sustain "morally suspect governmental action" (p. 116). But how is the 
judge to know when the government action in question must be considered 
"morally suspect"? According to Perry, in most, if not all, contemporary 
human rights cases, the Constitution provides no guide. Assuming that it 
does make sense to believe, as Perry does, that we can know what is morally 
right, can the judge also know at what point on the moral evolutionary 
scale our society now rests, or even the direction in which moral evolution 
is now moving? If the judge cannot identify with certainty our current 
moral conventions, and if she cannot determine with confidence the direc-
tion in which our morality is evolving, her undertaking of the prophetic 
function Perry envisions could well result in the determination of our pub-
lic morality instead of the facilitation of its (more natural) growth. Indeed, 
Perry is critical of a method of noninterpretivism according to which the 
judge "predicts progress" (pp. 114-15). He claims that his conception of 
noninterpretive review is not concerned ( or at least not preoccupied) with 
whether the judge decides human rights cases in a way which "tomorrow's 
majority might come to credit as progress" (p. 115). Perry's point is not that 
noninterpretive review answers human rights questions in a way which 
turns out to be correct (e.g., in a way which would comport with answers 
that society would ultimately give to those questions without noninterpre-
tive review), but that noninterpretive review helps us in our commitment to 
aspire to give right answers to our political-moral problems. Perhaps the 
difference between a judicial process which predicts progress and deter-
44. In the last chapter, Perry's adamant support for judicial validation of the claims of the 
institutionalized suggests that his conception of moral growth and evolution differs considera-
bly from that of, say, the Moral Majority. See pp. 147-62. 
45. Perry also notes that "it is possible that noninterpretive review will retard rather than 
advance the polity's political morality." P. 115 (emphasis added). The notion of retarding 
moral evolution might be taken in two ways. First, it might mean that the Court could decide 
a case on the basis of substantive moral values which are simply incompatible with those 
which society, given its current state of moral evolution, would or should endorse. Second, it 
could mean that the Court's decision is simply so out of line with prevailing moral conceptions 
that it would tend to unsettle society's efforts to engage in a coherent and deliberate process of 
moral introspection. If Perry uses "retard" in the former sense, he might be taken to accept the 
existence of a single, correct answer to political-moral problems which can (must?) be derived 
from a single, authoritative moral system - a position which he explicitly seeks to avoid. (If 
he cannot avoid this position, his theory is especially vulnerable to claims of elitism.) On the 
other hand, if a "retarding" noninterpretive decision is one which merely derails the process by 
which society subjects public policy to moral criticism, Perry could consistently maintain the 
argument that morally correct answers are not preordained. 
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mines our public morality and one which (merely) helps fulfill our commit-
ment to (provisionally) right moral answers is less ambiguous than I 
perceive it to be. But a judge who is uncertain of the difference, and who is 
reluctant to impose upon society her personal moral conceptions, may be 
reluctant to accept the role Perry would give her. 
In this regard, it is important to examine how Perry's judge is instructed 
to proceed. If the judge is instructed to decide human rights cases purely on 
the basis of her own personal, subjective, idiosyncratic moral convictions, 
even those persons otherwise sympathetic to Perry's purposes (like myself) 
will be reluctant to endorse his theory. Although Perry claims that Con-
gress has plenary control over noninterpretive review, few persons are likely 
to be persuaded that such control can or will impose meaningful restraints 
on a practice whose antidemocratic characteristics Perry emphatically con-
cedes. However, notwithstanding Perry's assertion that the judge must de-
rive the norms that are to be applied to evaluate government action from 
her own values ( or her own moral vision), I do not read him to claim that 
the judge should rely upon her purely idiosyncratic moral conceptions. In-
deed, Perry argues that the right answer which the judge seeks lies at ( or 
somewhere near) a point where "a variety of philosophical and religious 
systems of moral thought and belief converge" (p. 109 (emphasis in origi-
nal)). If the judge's function in noninterpretive review is to identify the 
area(s) where contemporary and perhaps competing moral theories inter-
sect - a point where the right moral answer either resides or from which its 
location can readily be discerned - then the discretion which a judge can 
exercise must be understood in a limited sense. Like Dworkin's Hercules, 
Perry's judge can only employ her own judgment as to what morality re-
quires to the extent that such a judgment is inevitable: the process of judg-
ing, at some point, requires one to exercise judgment. 46 On this 
interpretation, Perry's judge can be contrasted with Dworkin's Herbert:47 
she cannot act, like Herbert, on the basis of her own, idiosyncratic moral 
convictions to supplement or modify a decision which "objective" moral 
theory requires. At least where she can discern the difference between her 
own moral preferences and those emanating from the point at which extant 
systems of moral thought converge, she must decide according to the 
latter.48 
As I said before, I am not a philosopher. But if my comparison of 
46. R. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 124. 
47. Id. at 125-26. 
48. After several readings of Perry's book, I cannot say with confidence whether he would 
agree with this interpretation. In fact, despite his bold assertion that judges derive the moral 
values they are to enforce from within themselves, I find his treatment of the matter fraught 
with either ambiguity or ambivalence. Contrast, for example, his claim that judges derive the 
determinative norms from their own moral vision (p. 123) with his later discussion of the 
relationship between the presidential appointments power and popular control over noninter-
pretive review: 
Moreover, the appointments power can serve to prevent the appointment to the Court of 
individuals who are so idiosyncratic or exotic in their own moral values and sensibilities 
as to be hopelessly (and dangerously) out of touch with the larger moral culture, which 
must function to some (indeterminate) extent as a constraint on the outer reaches of judi-
cial innovation. 
P. 143 (footnote omitted). 
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Perry's judge and Dworkin's Hercules is at least plausible, the fact that 
Perry's judge does not really act or decide independently (or from a point 
outside) of the legal system will not do much to assuage his critics. If the 
literature reacting to Dworkin can be taken as a guide,49 the notion that 
there is a meaningful distinction between strong or absolute and weak 
forms of discretion is not a popular one. Moreover, Dworkin at least be-
lieves that when a judge engages in moral reasoning, her task is to deter-
mine the rights that the system already has expressed its willingness to 
embrace; that is, in constitutional cases, Dworkin's judge at least purports 
to be interpreting the Constitution. Perry's judge, however, is doing some-
thing quite different. She actively engages in the creation of law, without 
even the pretense of purporting that the "law" antedated her decision.so 
These observations lead to what I view as one of the most troubling 
implications of Perry's theory. As previously suggested, Perry makes 
noninterpretivism respectable by conceding that the Court, when undertak-
ing noninterpretive review, engages in a nonconstitutional lawmaking func-
tion. There can be no doubt that the Court's ability to facilitate effective 
and meaningful moral evaluation of public policy - indeed, ultimately, its 
ability to perform its noninterpretive function at all - depends crucially on 
its institutional prestige. Even when it engages in interpretive review, the 
Court often has been reminded of its limited political capital and cautioned 
that its forays into the political process must be tempered by discipline and 
moderation.st Professor Perry, however, would have the Court intervene in 
the political processes with a confident ferocity for the purpose of enforcing 
its "own moral vision" of human rights. The question arises whether the 
fierce activism Perry espouses will have the effect of seriously depleting the 
Court's political capital and undermining ultimately its ability to undertake 
effectively its functions of both noninterpretive and interpretive review. 
In considering this question, it is important to note the extent to which 
- at least in academic mythology - the Court and the Constitution have 
been equated. Professor Bickel once wrote that "[w]ith us the symbol of 
nationhood, of continuity, of unity and common purpose, is, of course, the 
Constitution, without particular reference to what exactly it means in this or 
that application."S2 He went on to note that "it has in large part been left to 
the Supreme Court to concretize the symbol of the Constitution."S3 Charles 
49. The voluminous literature directed toward Dworkin's thesis is overwhelmingly critical. 
For prominent examples, see Jurisprudence Symposium, 11 GA. L. REV. 969, 969-1199 (1977); 
Leedes, The Supreme Court Mess, 57 TEXAS L. REV. 1361, 1379-92 (1979); Reynolds, Dworkin 
as Quixote, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 574 (1975); Soper,Legal Theory and the Obligation ofa Judge: 
The Hart/ Dworkin Dispute, 75 MICH. L. REv. 473 (1977). For more sympathetic reactions, see 
Denvir, Professor Dworkin and an Activist Theory of Constitutional Adjudication, 45 ALB. L. 
REv. 13 (1980); Fried, The Laws of Change: The Cunning of Reason in Moral and Legal His-
tory, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 335 (1980). 
50. At most, Perry's judge seeks and enforces "background rights" - those which "provide 
a justification for political decisions . . . in the abstract." R. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 93. 
51. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); J. CHOPER, supra note 
6, at 129-70. For an argument suggesting that too much moderation can also undermine the 
Court's political capital, see M. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 39 (1966). 
52. A. BICKEL, supra note 51, at 3 I. 
53. Id. 
March 1983) Making Noninterpretivism Respectable 795 
Miller observed that the Court has become "the living manifestation of the 
constitutional symbol."54 He quoted with approval Paul Freund's observa-
tion that "[w]e accept the Court as a symbol in the measure that, while 
performing its appointed tasks, it manages at the same time to articulate 
and rationalize the aspirations reflected in the Constitution."55 And Max 
Lerner concluded that "[t]he Supreme Court as symbol goes hand in hand 
with the Constitution as symbol."56 He went on to suggest that "we transfer 
our sense of the definitive and timeless character of the Constitution to the 
judges who expound it."57 As described by these commentators, the 
Court's relationship to the Constitution is, in an important sense, parasitic. 
The Court traditionally has claimed its authority from the Constitution it-
self, drawing from the Constitution both its entitlement to exercise political 
power and its institutional prestige. Before Perry, many commentators who 
considered judicial review in prophetic terms did so not primarily on the 
basis of the Court's institutional characteristics or the justices' personal 
qualities, but rather on the basis of the commentators' conception of the 
Constitution itself. It was the Constitution which was perceived as either 
embodying or suggesting values alleged to have religious (or religious-like) 
significance.58 To the extent that belief in the Constitution's religious sig-
nificance has diminished, the Court's claim to prophetic status has been 
undercut. That is, absent the Court's (or the commentator's) ability to link 
persuasively the product generated by its "prophecy" to the constitutional 
document, perceptions of the legitimacy of its power and its institutional 
prestige have been pro tanto undermined. 
It seems to me that the Court's relationship to, and dependence upon, 
the Constitution is much deeper than Perry's theory admits and that there is 
a real danger that his theory will threaten seriously to jeopardize that rela-
tionship. Perry repeatedly rejects the suggestion that noninterpretive re-
view - and thus (virtually) all of the Court's modem decisions pertaining 
to individual rights - has even the remotest connection to values constitu-
tionalized by the framers. Instead, all of these decisions embody the 
Court's own moral vision. Indeed, Perry believes that there is no justifica-
tion for the Court not to be candid about this fact (p. 140). Let me suggest, 
however, a reason that unrestrained candor59 may be ill-advised. Once the 
54. C. MILLER, supra note 40, at 185. 
55. Id., quoting P. FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 89 (1961). 
56. Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE L.J. 1290, 1293 (1937). 
51. Id. at 1312. 
58. q: A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 14 (1970) ("At the 
tum of the century, leaders of opinion consecrated the Constitution, and deified the judges 
who were the Constitution's supposed impersonal voices."). 
59. Perry's commitment to judicial candor with respect to the courts' policymaking func-
tion should be examined in the context of his rejection of even prudentially based limits on 
that function. In rejecting the notion that judges should, in institutional-reform litigation, 
"exercise caution in defining the underlying right [that their] remedial orders are designed to 
vindicate," p. 161, he concludes that "[t)he judiciary must not forsake its prophetic function 
simply because its ability to secure compliance is sometimes weak ...• " P. 162 (footnote 
omitted). Thus, even where there may be substantial reason for judges to doubt that their 
conception of human rights will make an immediate difference - that is, where public resist-
ance and opposition to the court's function is the strongest - they are instructed to declare the 
existence of rights which, in candor, derive from within themselves. 
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Court confesses that its primary function is one of policymaking, its rela-
tionship to the Constitution will cease to be an important source of legiti-
mation. (Indeed, candor should require the Court to concede publicly that, 
to the extent its contemporary human rights decisions had been justified in 
constitutional terms, most of its modem work-product was fraudulently ad-
vertised!) The Court will then be exposed for what it really is - an agency 
of government (and an unaccountable one at that) whose principal respon-
sibility is nothing more or less than to engage in a process of moral reflec-
tion and to impose the results of that process against the moral conventions 
embodied in electorally accountable policymaking. Now it may be that the 
public will be willing to forgive and forget; it may even be that the public 
has come to see the moral soundness of all of the Court's modem noninter-
pretive decisions and will overlook the Court's past hypocrisy or, better yet, 
bestow upon the Court its deepest gratitude. But given the controversy that 
still rages with respect to the Court's modem decisions in such areas as 
racial segregation (and in particular those decisions governing desegrega-
tion remedies), school prayers, abortion and personal privacy, I wonder 
whether the Court's current stock of institutional capital could long survive. 
To be sure, Perry argues that the public can and even should respond to the 
Court's mea culpa by regulating its jurisdiction. This control may, he sug-
gests, serve as an outlet valve for public hostility. But he also recognizes 
that legislative inertia, as well as other factors, may prevent a significant 
expression of public disapproval.60 In any event, I am less sanguine than 
Perry with respect to the Court's ability to withstand the political buffeting 
his theory invites.61 
There is a final point that warrants mention. If the Court is as depen-
dent upon the authority of the Constitution as I have suggested, a candid 
confession of the policymaking nature of noninterpretive review may not 
only undermine its ability to protect human rights in noninterpretive con-
texts, but may also adversely affect its ability to perform an interpretive 
function. Although Perry argues that the distinction between interpretive 
and noninterpretive review is clear - at least with respect to modem 
human rights decisions (p. 130) - many readers (including myself) may be 
less confident of this proposition. 62 Once the Court comes out of the closet 
and announces that virtually all of its contemporary human-rights output is 
noninterpretive, can we afford to be confident that the public will (continue 
to) believe the Court's (or the commentators') claim that at least some deci-
sions are or have been interpretive? If the public is less sanguine than Perry 
60. Perry admits that "Congress' jurisdiction-limiting power is not a source of perfect con-
trol over noninterpretive review" but believes that it is "deeply unrealistic to insist on perfect 
control." P. 138. 
61. Although Perry concedes that there may be significant impediments to the exercise of 
congressional power, he denies that they can be understood properly as rendering that power 
ineffective. Pp. 134-35. 
62. See, e.g., Levinson, The Tum Toward Functionalism in Constitutional Theory: Some 
Preliminary Observations, 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. __ (forthcoming) ("I do not share Perry's 
optimism that clear criteria exist for this demarcation (assuming that one accepts the possibil-
ity of interpretivism in the first place, about which I am skeptical)."); Levinson, Law as Litera• 
ture, 60 TEXAS L. REV. 373 (1982); see also Sedler, The Legitimacy Debate in Constitutional 
Adjudication: An Assessment and a JJ!fferent Perspective, _ OHIO ST. L.J. _ (forthcoming). 
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about the Court's entitlement or ability to engage in moral prophecy, will 
its hostility diminish the effectiveness of the Court's power in interpretive 
situations?63 
There is, of course, no way to predict confidently the answers to such 
questions. We live in a political culture which has presumed that the 
Court's function in human rights cases is to interpret the Constitution. In-
deed, the Court continues to reaffirm its own endorsement of this presump-
tion. To be sure, some interpretivist theorists and nationally syndicated 
columnists claim that the Court has routinely ignored the Constitution. I 
would guess, however, that most reasonably well-informed members of the 
American public would not be so sure. Moreover, while we no doubt are 
committed to electorally accountable policymaking, my own view is that 
both the nature of that commitment and the line which separates nonconsti-
tutional policymaking from constitutional interpretation are more obscure 
than Perry believes. No doubt there are grounds for legitimate doubt with 
respect to the constitutional pedigree of many constitutional decisions, but 
that may be better understood as reflecting the inherent complexities of 
constitutional interpretation rather than the intentional flouting of the Con-
stitution by noninterpretivistjudges and theorists.64 Perry, however, claims 
confidently that the Court has been going well beyond the range of legiti-
mate interpretation and that the public has all along been up to its real 
game. With equal confidence, he claims that while we have understood the 
Court's hypocrisy, we have also understood that the "dogmatism" of inter-
pretivism is fundamentally irreconcilable with our deep commitment to a 
morally reflective and enlightened political order. But what if Perry's confi-
dence on these matters is misplaced? It may be that the Court could with-
stand the disapprobation Perry's theory may invite - it may even be that 
the moral quality of both the process and substance of public policymaking 
would be better served with a candid but impotent Court than one which is 
more circumspect concerning the proper limits of constitutional interpreta-
tion and less bold in admitting its uncertainties - but Perry has left me 
with serious doubts.65 
IV 
Although Professor Perry's book may make noninterpretivism respecta-
ble, it makes a much more important contribution to constitutional theory. 
Those of us who believe that the Court can and should play an active role 
63. For a more extensive elaboration of this problem and an examination of its significance 
for Dean Choper's approach to constitutional theory, see Saphire, Book Review, 6 U. DAYTON 
L. REV. 359, 374-79 (1981) (reviewing J. CHOPER, supra note 6). 
64. See Sandalow, supra note 34, at 1060-68. 
65. Since I still believe that much (if not all) of the Court's modem decisions protecting 
individual rights plausibly can be understood and defended as constitutional interpretation, I 
reject the notion that the Court must or should announce otherwise. However, even if I were 
to accept Perry's conclusion that the Court has been engaged in pure policymaking, I would 
still be cautious in suggesting that it should (at least precipitously) be candid in announcing 
otherwise. Although there is much to recommend candor, see Forrester, Are We Ready for 
Truth in Judging?, 63 A.B.A. J. 1212 (1977)- and Perry makes some thoughtful arguments on 
its behalf, pp. 140-43 - it is not necessarily the exclusive, nor always the most important, 
political or moral value. 
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in the elaboration and protection of human rights may disagree with Perry's 
conclusion that those rights cannot fairly be interpreted from the Constitu-
tion. But, whether the Court looks for its moral values inside the Constitu-
tion or elsewhere, it must - and we who evaluate it must - begin to reflect 
more deeply about the content those values do and should possess.66 Even 
if one concludes that Perry has conceded more to democratic theory than 
was necessary, his powerful articulation and defense of the Court's obliga-
tion to confront the morality of public policy is compelling. But if the 
Court is to participate actively in our moral life - whether the object of 
that participation is the facilitation of moral evolution, moral growth or 
moral awakening - it must begin to take moral philosophy seriously. 
Perry is, I believe, correct in his conclusion that this is a responsibility that 
the Court cannot avoid. Nor is there persuasive reason to believe that it 
should. As Professor Richards has argued, there is nothing inherent in the 
method of moral philosophy which would make it unsuitable or unmanage-
able for judges. 67 
There are, of course, some unsettling effects associated with a judicial 
process which takes seriously and without embarrassment its responsibility 
to accept moral reasoning as an essential ingredient of constitutional inter-
pretation. For moral reasoning to be most efficacious, it must be under-
taken in a conscious, critical and reflective way. Although there may be no 
compelling reason to believe that judges are not capable of such self-con-
scious reflection,68 traditional processes of judicial selection have placed lit-
tle importance on a candidate's formal training in philosophy or prowess 
for philosophical reflection. Thus, Dean Ely's admonition against ac-
cepting the notion that judges qua individuals are somehow more accom-
plished at moral philosophy than others has some merit.69 But that may be, 
in part, because judges (and those who select them) have seldom confronted 
in a self-conscious way the indispensability of moral discourse in constitu-
tional interpretation.70 Moreover, the point seems not to be whether judges 
are or can be better philosophers than (say) legislators. If and when moral 
66. I have developed this theme more extensively elsewhere. See Saphire, Sllpra note 43, at 
345-72. 
67. Richards, Moral Philosophy and the Search for Fundamental Values in Constitutional 
Law, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 319, 323-30 (1981). See also Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitu-
tional J)emocracy, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 659, 668-69. 
68. Although there is considerable doubt concerning the extent that legal education has 
either encouraged or developed the capacity of lawyers to engage in critical moral reasoning, 
this may in part be attributable to an assumption that moral and legal reasoning are mutually 
exclusive (or at least not necessarily related) processes. A major contribution of the constitu-
tional scholarship of, for example, Professors Perry, Dworkin, Greenawalt, and Michelman, 
has been its role in stimulating a reexamination of this assumption. For provocative discus-
sions of the role of moral reasoning in legal education, see Kronman, Foreword: Legal Schol• 
arship and Moral Education, 90 YALE L.J. 955 (1981); Richards, Moral Theory, The 
J)evelopmental Psychology of Ethical Autonomy and Professionalism, 31 J. LEGAL Eouc. 359 
(1981). 
69. J. ELY, Sllpra note 8, at 56-60. 
70. For an eloquent discussion of the dilemmas confronting a judge who believes in the 
propriety of subjecting public policy to moral critique but who is uncertain of his authority to 
decide cases on the basis of conclusions drawn from that critique, see Michelman, Sllpra note 
31, at 1005-07. 
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reasoning is accepted as an essential component of constitutional interpre-
tation, judges necessarily will begin to take seriously their responsibility to 
familiarize themselves with moral theories and to develop the necessary ex-
pertise. Moreover, despite protestations to the contrary,7 1 it seems to me 
that Professor Perry is correct in his belief that the judicial process often 
may offer the only real opportunity for sustained moral reflection on impor-
tant political-moral issues. 
Finally, to say that judges should engage in self-conscious moral evalua-
tion is not to conclude that they must always interpose their moral concep-
tions against the current popular will. I must confess that, in my first 
reading of Perry's book, I was somewhat discomforted by the relative ease 
with which, in the last chapter, he applies his theory to justify judicial ef-
forts to vindicate the claims of mental patients, prisoners and other "margi-
nal persons."72 In a democracy, perhaps a court exercising presumptively 
illegitimate power would want to move more cautiously, even knowing that 
it is not subject to popular control. But Perry concedes that a court adopt-
ing his theory may very well "hand down many decisions sustaining mor-
ally suspect governmental action" (p. 116). And if he and his theory are to 
be taken seriously, he (and we) must be prepared to accept decisions we 
don't like, or mobilize the political processes to prevent the (federal) courts 
from continuing their abuses.73 This may not be an unreasonable price to 
pay for a public policy that is morally principled. 
Perry's book also presents a challenge to the Court's academic critics. 
Consider, in this regard, Cardozo's observation with respect to judicial use 
of the "method of philosophy": 
The judge who moulds the law by the method of philosophy may be satis-
fying an intellectual craving for symmetry of form and substance. But he 
is doing something more. He is keeping the law true in its response to a 
deep-seated and imperious sentiment. Only experts perhaps may be able 
to gauge the quality of his work and appraise its significance. But their 
judgment, the judgment of the lawyer class, will spread to others, and tinge 
71. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 8, at 56-60. 
72. That is not to say that I disagree with his conclusions concerning the merits of recent 
institutional reform litigation successfully challenging the outrageous and inhumane condi-
tions existing, traditionally and in the·present, in many of our public institutions. I do not. 
See Saphire, The Civilly-Committed Public Mental Patient and the Right to Aftercare, 4 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 232 (1976). But my commitment to the legitimate scope of electorally accounta-
ble policymaking is less dogmatic than Perry's. Moreover, I believe that much of what Perry 
deems judicial policymaking can be understood and defended as constitutional interpretation. 
See Saphire, supra note 23. 
Indeed, in reading the last chapter, entitled "Judicial Protection of 'Marginal' Persons," 
one may recall Kent Greenawalt's observation concerning Dworkin's rights thesis: 
Dworkin's thesis is a means for shielding activist judges from the charges of usurpation. 
When linked with his denigration of welfare arguments and his approval of rights argu-
ments, it forms a perfect apologia for the work of a court like the Warren Court that gives 
extensive protection to unpopular claims of individual rights. 
Greenawalt, Judicial .Decision, supra note 32, at 1036. The difference, of course, is that Perry 
concedes the usurpation issue up front and concedes Congress' power to harness the Court. 
But Perry himself is most doubtful as to Congress' willingness to exercise that power - and 
indeed of the propriety (as opposed to legality) of such an exercise of that power. 
73. In the alternative, each of us "has the option of becoming, with Bork, a defender of 
interpretivism instead" (p. 119). 
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the common consciousness and the common faith.74 
As Cardozo noted- and as Judge Bork has recently agreed75 - the imme-
diate and perhaps principal burden of criticizing and influencing the Court 
will fall on the academic "experts." It will be up to us not only to evaluate 
the Court's moral vision, but to guide it as well. Clearly, that will be a 
heavy burden. And if the interpretivists' observations are correct with re-
spect to the doubtful credentials most law professors have as moral philoso-
phers 76 - as they surely must be -it will not be an easy burden to bear. 
If, however, noninterpretivists wish to maintain a constructive role in the 
development of morally sound constitutional doctrine - if we are to par-
ticipate with Michael Perry in facilitating a genuine intellectual advance in 
constitutional theory - we must become less preoccupied with the legiti-
macy of noninterpretive review and join with Perry in exploring the 
profound issues of morality that his theory evokes. 
V 
As I hope this essay has made clear, I believe that Professor Perry's 
book makes an extraordinarily important contribution to the literature of 
constitutional theory. Among contemporary efforts to develop a functional 
justification for an active judicial role in the protection of individual 
rights,77 Perry's is, in my judgment, the most powerful and compelling. A 
staunch defender of judicial activism, Perry has taken on the traditional 
objections to activism and has accepted the personally unappealing conse-
quences which he believes a principled theory requires. While Perry may 
enhance the cause of noninterpretivist theory by making it respectable, he 
has done much more. Through his unusual ability to combine passion and 
reason, he has helped clarify the directions in which those of us concerned 
with enhancing the morality of our constitutional order must move. 
The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights will, I believe, come to 
be regarded as one of the most respected and influential works in constitu-
tional law of our generation. Robert Nozick's recent observation concern-
ing the literature of philosophy captures poignantly my reaction to Perry's 
work and provides, it seems to me, a fitting way to close: 
I find I usually read works of philosophy with all defenses up, with a 
view to finding out where the author has gone wrong. Occasionally, after a 
short amount of reading, I find myself switched to a different mode; I be-
come open to what the author has to teach. No doubt the voice of the 
author plays a role, perhaps also his not being coercive. An additional 
factor affects my stance. Sometimes a writer will begin with a thought sun-
ilar to one I have had and been pleased with, except that his is more 
74. B. CARDOZO, supra note 31, at 35. 
75. Bork, Role of the Court, supra note I, at 1138-39. 
76. See, e.g., Posner, Book Review, 1981 AM. B. FOUNDATION RES. J. 231 (reviewing B. 
ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980)); Posner, The Present Situation in ' 
Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE LJ. 1113, 1127-29 (1981). 
77. See, e.g., J. CHOPER,supra note 6; R. NEELY, How COURTS GOVERN AMERICA (1981). 
For a listing and analysis of functional approaches to constitutional theory, see Perry, The 
Abortion Funding Cases: A Comment on the Supreme Court's Role in American Government, 66 
Geo. LJ. 1191, 1201-06 (1978). 
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profound or subtle. Or after reading the first few sentences I may have 
thoughts or objections which the author then will go on to state or meet 
more acutely. Here, clearly, is someone from whom I can leam.78 
Clearly, Michael Perry is someone from whom we all can learn. 
78. R. NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 6 (1981). 
